13.5.20 Bergson, time and the unconcsious
‘Basic to the philosophy of Bergson is his distinction between time as spatialized and time as experienced. "Spatialized" time is mathematical, a "clock time" all of whose parts are alike and all of whose instants are static. When analyzed, such a time turns out to be not time at all but a "fourth dimension of space." By contrast, experienced time is a qualitative duration, no new parts of which are identical or capable of being repeated. In his first book (Essai sur les donnees immediates de la conscience (1889), translated as Time and Free Will; an Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness (1910), Bergson limits duration to the human stream of consciousness: "Pure duration is the form which the succession of our conscious states assumes when our ego . . . refrains from separating its present state from its former states." (TFW, 100.) In such circumstances we form ". .. both the past and the present states into an organic whole as happens when we recall the notes of a tune, melting, so to speak, into one another." (Ibid.) Duration is thus experienced as a melodic continuity, a flow. Unfortunately, Bergson complains, our ordinary thought breaks up this organic becoming into atomized fragments. This is, in fact, the essential function of a spatialized, mathe- matical time. It presents us with a fixed, stable, neatly segmented world in which we can safely go about our practical affairs. But while such a schema is useful, it is liable to prejudice the philosopher and the psychologist who may forget what it leaves out. While an atomized, fragmented world contains nothing that should not be, in principle, predictable, the experienced world of "inner duration" exhibits the emergence of novelty: the appearance of the really surprising, the ontologically new. In other words, for Bergson inner duration provides a paradigm of creativity; spatialized time provides a paradigm of predictable repetition. (Gunter, 1982, p635)
Bergson differentiates between ‘spatialized time’ and ‘experienced time’. He ‘limits duration to the human stream of consciousness’ and ultimately to what he calls a ‘flow’, an ‘organic becoming’. This sounds similar to Csikzentmihalyi’s flow, but Robert says it’s almost the opposite. I must find out more about this.
And I really like the sound of this too. It sounds like me when I knit.
‘the experienced world of "inner duration" exhibits the emergence of novelty: the appearance of the really surprising, the ontologically new. In other words, for Bergson inner duration provides a paradigm of creativity’.
‘In Bergson's philosophy, duration is renamed and also partially reconceived as "memory," while memory is shown to be in constant and fertile interaction with matter.’
‘In Bergson's psychological duration there is no clear-cut distinction between present and past: the past shades into the present with- out precise boundaries. It is only a slight extension of this idea to conclude that there is no clear-cut distinction between our present and the totality of our past, that is, between our present state and the totality of our personal memory. Thus, Bergson (like Freud) postulates that all of our memories are conserved and make up our unconscious mind.
It is this unconscious mind which constitutes the basis of our character and nourishes our free acts: The whole of our past psychical life conditions our present state, without being its necessary determinant; whole also, it reveals itself in our character, although no one of its past states manifests itself explicitly in character. (MM, 191) It may appear that in recollection we return in thought from the present to the past, but the truth is quite different: in recollection our memories return to us, often involuntarily. Our brains operate so as to screen out most of this forgotten background, else we would be inundated by reminiscences. As it is, our lives are a sort of dialectical tension between our unconscious, perpetually seeking expression, and our present, practically-oriented action which, thanks to the focal power of our neural system, enables us to "attend to life’ (Gunter, 1982, p636-7)
Interesting links between time, memory and matter…
‘there is no clear-cut distinction between our present and the totality of our past, that is, between our present state and the totality of our personal memory. Thus, Bergson (like Freud) postulates that all of our memories are conserved and make up our unconscious mind.’
And ‘our lives are a sort of dialectical tension between our unconscious, perpetually seeking expression, and our present, practically-oriented action which, thanks to the focal power of our neural system, enables us to "attend to life’’
Intriguing tension between the conscious and unconscious mind…
Gunter, P. (1982) ‘Bergson and Jung.’ Journal of the History of Ideas 43, no. 4 635-52. Available at: doi:10.2307/2709347 https://www-jstor-org.bathspa.idm.oclc.org/stable/pdf/2709347.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Ad4079c4f9de70ee3d9a34e04e6fc80f4 (Accessed: May 13 2020)
Vitaly Bergelson is a Professor in Mathematics and Physical Sciences at Ohio State University
‘By making time ’ s duration palpable – “ marking time ” in the sense of imbuing it with tonality, weight, and rhythm – Bergelson revealed the potentiality of the present.’ (Murav, no date, p7)
Murav, H (no date) Marking time: Bergelson and Bergson Available at: https://docserv.uni-duesseldorf.de/servlets/DerivateServlet/Derivate-23711/12_Leket_Murav_Marking_Time_A.pdf (Accessed 13 May 2020)
‘Basic to the philosophy of Bergson is his distinction between time as spatialized and time as experienced. "Spatialized" time is mathematical, a "clock time" all of whose parts are alike and all of whose instants are static. When analyzed, such a time turns out to be not time at all but a "fourth dimension of space." By contrast, experienced time is a qualitative duration, no new parts of which are identical or capable of being repeated. In his first book (Essai sur les donnees immediates de la conscience (1889), translated as Time and Free Will; an Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness (1910), Bergson limits duration to the human stream of consciousness: "Pure duration is the form which the succession of our conscious states assumes when our ego . . . refrains from separating its present state from its former states." (TFW, 100.) In such circumstances we form ". .. both the past and the present states into an organic whole as happens when we recall the notes of a tune, melting, so to speak, into one another." (Ibid.) Duration is thus experienced as a melodic continuity, a flow. Unfortunately, Bergson complains, our ordinary thought breaks up this organic becoming into atomized fragments. This is, in fact, the essential function of a spatialized, mathe- matical time. It presents us with a fixed, stable, neatly segmented world in which we can safely go about our practical affairs. But while such a schema is useful, it is liable to prejudice the philosopher and the psychologist who may forget what it leaves out. While an atomized, fragmented world contains nothing that should not be, in principle, predictable, the experienced world of "inner duration" exhibits the emergence of novelty: the appearance of the really surprising, the ontologically new. In other words, for Bergson inner duration provides a paradigm of creativity; spatialized time provides a paradigm of predictable repetition. (Gunter, 1982, p635)
Bergson differentiates between ‘spatialized time’ and ‘experienced time’. He ‘limits duration to the human stream of consciousness’ and ultimately to what he calls a ‘flow’, an ‘organic becoming’. This sounds similar to Csikzentmihalyi’s flow, but Robert says it’s almost the opposite. I must find out more about this.
And I really like the sound of this too. It sounds like me when I knit.
‘the experienced world of "inner duration" exhibits the emergence of novelty: the appearance of the really surprising, the ontologically new. In other words, for Bergson inner duration provides a paradigm of creativity’.
‘In Bergson's philosophy, duration is renamed and also partially reconceived as "memory," while memory is shown to be in constant and fertile interaction with matter.’
‘In Bergson's psychological duration there is no clear-cut distinction between present and past: the past shades into the present with- out precise boundaries. It is only a slight extension of this idea to conclude that there is no clear-cut distinction between our present and the totality of our past, that is, between our present state and the totality of our personal memory. Thus, Bergson (like Freud) postulates that all of our memories are conserved and make up our unconscious mind.
It is this unconscious mind which constitutes the basis of our character and nourishes our free acts: The whole of our past psychical life conditions our present state, without being its necessary determinant; whole also, it reveals itself in our character, although no one of its past states manifests itself explicitly in character. (MM, 191) It may appear that in recollection we return in thought from the present to the past, but the truth is quite different: in recollection our memories return to us, often involuntarily. Our brains operate so as to screen out most of this forgotten background, else we would be inundated by reminiscences. As it is, our lives are a sort of dialectical tension between our unconscious, perpetually seeking expression, and our present, practically-oriented action which, thanks to the focal power of our neural system, enables us to "attend to life’ (Gunter, 1982, p636-7)
Interesting links between time, memory and matter…
‘there is no clear-cut distinction between our present and the totality of our past, that is, between our present state and the totality of our personal memory. Thus, Bergson (like Freud) postulates that all of our memories are conserved and make up our unconscious mind.’
And ‘our lives are a sort of dialectical tension between our unconscious, perpetually seeking expression, and our present, practically-oriented action which, thanks to the focal power of our neural system, enables us to "attend to life’’
Intriguing tension between the conscious and unconscious mind…
Gunter, P. (1982) ‘Bergson and Jung.’ Journal of the History of Ideas 43, no. 4 635-52. Available at: doi:10.2307/2709347 https://www-jstor-org.bathspa.idm.oclc.org/stable/pdf/2709347.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Ad4079c4f9de70ee3d9a34e04e6fc80f4 (Accessed: May 13 2020)
Vitaly Bergelson is a Professor in Mathematics and Physical Sciences at Ohio State University
‘By making time ’ s duration palpable – “ marking time ” in the sense of imbuing it with tonality, weight, and rhythm – Bergelson revealed the potentiality of the present.’ (Murav, no date, p7)
Murav, H (no date) Marking time: Bergelson and Bergson Available at: https://docserv.uni-duesseldorf.de/servlets/DerivateServlet/Derivate-23711/12_Leket_Murav_Marking_Time_A.pdf (Accessed 13 May 2020)